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Abstract
The integrated information theory (IIT) is a theory of consciousness that was originally
formulated, and is standardly still expressed, in terms of controversial interpretations of
its own ontological and epistemological basis. These form the orthodox interpretation of
IIT. The orthodox epistemological interpretation is the axiomatic method, whereby IIT is
ultimately derived from, justified by, and beholden to, a set of phenomenological axioms.
The orthodox ontological interpretation is panpsychism, according to which consciousness
is fundamental, intrinsic, and pervasive. In this paper it is argued that both components
of the orthodox interpretation should be rejected. But IIT should not be rejected since
an interpretation-neutral formulation is available. After explaining the neutral formulation, more plausible non-axiomatic epistemologies are defended. The neutral formulation is
then shown to be consistent with various contemporary physicalist ontologies of consciousness, including the phenomenal concepts strategy, representationalism, and even illusionism.
Along the way, instructive connections between interpretations of IIT and interpretations of
quantum mechanics, are noted.
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1

Theory and Interpretation

Scientific theories are often framed in terms of the philosophical assumptions of their founders.
Perhaps the most striking example is quantum theory, which was framed, throughout much of
the twentieth century, in terms of the philosophical assumptions of Danish physicist Niels Bohr.
This expression of quantum theory came to be known as the Copenhagen interpretation and is
commonly referred to as the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory.1
A more recent example from neuroscience is the integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT). IIT is almost invariably framed in terms of the substantive philosophical assumptions
of its founder, Guilio Tononi.2 I will therefore refer to these assumptions as the orthodox interpretation of IIT. When IIT is expressed in terms of these assumptions I will refer to it as
Orthodox-IIT.
The philosophical assumptions that make up an interpretation can be distinguished into
two kinds, ontological and epistemological. Ontological interpretations are claims about what
exists (if anything) according to the theory, or what reality must be like (if anything) given
the predictive success of the theory. Epistemological interpretations state what kind of evidence
supports the theory and how.
Contemporary interpretations of quantum theory are ontological but not epistemological.3
For it is relatively clear what the predictions of quantum theory are and we have been able to
confirm those predictions with modern technology. But in the case of IIT, it is relatively unclear
what its predictions are, and insofar as we can clarify them, current technology struggles to test
them. This not only raises the question of why we should believe IIT. It raises the question of
whether IIT can even be considered scientific. Epistemological interpretations of IIT attempt to
answer these questions.
The foundations of physics is the branch of physics that evaluates interpretations of quantum theory. Since at least the 1950’s it has been busy teasing apart the interpretation-neutral
quantum theory from its orthodox interpretation, critically examining the orthodox interpretation, and formulating and evaluating alternative interpretations.4 As a result, our understanding
of quantum theory has significantly progressed. This progress is inspiring the present project,
which aims to do the same for IIT. The basic idea behind this paper is that if quantum theory
can advance by extracting its core structure from its problematic orthodox interpretation, then
so too can IIT.
Interpretation-neutral integrated information theory (Neutral-IIT) is intended to be a “barebones” formulation that expresses only what is essential for an experimental neuroscientist to
apply the theory in practice, while minimizing (or ideally, completely removing) controversial
philosophical assumptions.5 There are many reasons for defining Neutral-IIT, isolating and
criticizing its orthodox interpretation, and formulating new, more plausible interpretations. One
is to combat much of the undeserved negative attention that IIT has received. There are now
many published criticisms of IIT. But while they do seriously challenge Orthodox-IIT, they
typically fail to address Neutral-IIT. The neutral formulation opens IIT up to a broader audience
who might otherwise reject it due to their philosophy of mind.
1 See

e.g. Griffith (2018, p5) and Albert (1992, p17).
Tononi (2004, 2008, 2012, 2017a, 2017b), Oizumi et. al (2014), Tononi & Koch (2015), and Tononi et.
al. (2016).
3 In quantum theory, there is a distinction between psi-epistemic and psi-ontic interpretations. These interpretations agree on what evidence supports quantum theory but give alternative accounts of the reality described
by quantum theory. Hence, they are both ontological but not epistemological interpretations, see e.g. Aaronson
et. al. (2013).
4 This author’s recent attempts to contribute to this field can be found in McQueen (2015) and McQueen and
Vaidman (2018).
5 For a quantum analogue of this project, see Wallace (forthcoming).
2 See
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Here is the structure of the paper. Section 2 describes the mathematical and empirical
content of Neutral-IIT. Section 3 describes epistemological interpretations. I begin by describing
the orthodox epistemological interpretation, the axiomatic method. I then explain why the
axiomatic method cannot work, and should be abandoned (Sec. 3.1). I then consider two more
plausible epistemological interpretations. The first denies that the axioms have an axiomatic
status, instead treating them as malleable postulates that might help to abductively confirm IIT
(Sec 3.2). The second denies that the axioms play any role in justifying the theory (Sec. 3.3).
Section 4 describes ontological interpretations. I describe the orthodox ontological interpretation before raising several objections to it (Sec. 4.1). I then show that contemporary philosophy
of mind provides a number of resources for developing more plausible ontologies that are immune
to the objections that befall Orthodox-IIT. I describe three physicalist interpretations, based on
the phenomenal concepts strategy (Sec. 4.2), representationalism (Sec. 4.3), and finally, illusionism (Sec. 4.4). I leave it to the reader to decide which is the superior physicalist interpretation
of IIT.

2

Interpretation-Neutral Integrated Information Theory

Integrated information theory (IIT) is presented as a theory of phenomenal consciousness. A
subject is phenomenally conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that subject.
A mental state is phenomenally conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be in
that state. In addition to this traditional definition (Nagel (1974)), Tononi offers an instructive
operational definition: phenomenal consciousness is what one loses when one falls into dreamless
sleep and then regains when one either wakes up or starts dreaming (Tononi et. al. (2016, p450)).
Finally, there is a dialectical definition: phenomenal consciousness is what’s being debated in
debates over the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995a). In what follows I refer to
phenomenal consciousness just as consciousness or experience.
Consciousness seems like a private phenomenon: while I can be certain about my own consciousness, I cannot be certain about the consciousness of others. Nonetheless, consciousness
manifests itself in the form of observable symptoms of consciousness. The most obvious of these
are phenomenal reports, whereby one describes one’s consciousness. In practice, such reports are
used to find the neural correlate of consciousness.
IIT claims to have identified the neural correlate of consciousness. According to IIT, it
is integrated information. Information is not like information in a book, it is an objective
measurable property of physical systems. When it takes a certain form, it can be said to be
integrated. I define these notions more formally below.
IIT has three core applications. It uses facts about the integrated information in a system to
determine (i) whether that system is conscious, (ii) to what extent it is conscious, and (iii) the
qualitative character (or qualia) of that system’s experience. That’s the basic idea. Let us now
consider how we can present this theory in detail, but in a way that strips it of its controversial
philosophical assumptions.
If the subject matter of IIT is consciousness, then the project of formulating an absolutely
philosophically neutral version of IIT might seem like a non-starter. For there are many prominent philosophers who claim that consciousness does not even exist, that it is an illusion! These
are the illusionists.6
Given illusionism, there are two options. We could concede that an absolutely neutral formulation of IIT is impossible, formulate Neutral-IIT as a theory of phenomenal consciousness
that is inconsistent with illusionism, and from there try to make it as philosophically neutral as
6 For

example, see Dennett (1991, 1998, 2016) and Frankish (2016).
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possible. Alternatively, we could try to find a way to define Neutral-IIT so that it is consistent
with both illusionism and realism about consciousness.
Here I take the second option. The main reason is that the core structure of IIT should
be open to illusionists. To see this, imagine that in the future we find out that our judgments
about phenomenal consciousness seem to always strongly correlate with information integration
in corresponding brain states. It is not clear that this would refute illusionism. In fact, illusionists
might want to say that information integration plays some important role in creating the illusion
(McQueen, forthcoming).7
To formulate Neutral-IIT so that it is neutral between illusionism and realism about consciousness, we must find some phenomena in the vicinity of consciousness that both parties agree
upon. The empirical content (the predictions) of Neutral-IIT may then concern correlations
between information integration and the agreed upon phenomena. The natural choice would be
uncontroversial observable symptoms of consciousness such as phenomenal reports. Phenomenal
reports are reports of how things consciously seem to subjects and how their experience feels to
them, etc. What Dennett (2003) calls the subject’s heterophenomenological world.
Neutral-IIT is therefore just a framework for helping researchers find the neural correlates of
consciousness (or its observable symptoms). It provides an account of what to look for: integrated
information in brain regions that correlate with the observable symptoms. And it provides the
means for making more precise predictions and testing them (discussed below). The framework
does not answer the question of why these correlations exist (the hard problem), and is consistent
with answers that postulate the reality of consciousness as well as those that do not.
To define Neutral-IIT, we need two ingredients. First, we need a mathematical formalism that
tells us how to calculate information integration. This is the mathematical content of the theory.
Second, we need a clear set of predictions that correlate information integration to observable
symptoms of consciousness. This is the empirical content of the theory. I will take each of these
in turn.

2.1

The mathematical content

There are three crucial notions that require formal definitions. The first two are information
and integration (or φ). The third has gone under various labels, and will here be referred
to as Q-shape. A Q-shape is an abstract structural property of integrated information. Under
Orthodox-IIT, for every qualitative character of experience (quale), there is a distinctive Q-shape
that determines that quale (Balduzzi & Tononi (2009)).
The mathematical formalism of the bare theory is just the mathematical formalism of IIT.
And so here, I will only explain the technical details that will be relevant to the subsequent
discussion. We will need a technical definition of information. Integration and Q-shape will play
less of a role in subsequent discussion and will receive only simple intuitive definitions.(Readers
already familiar with the mathematical formalism may proceed to section 2.2.)
In IIT, information is a measure of the extent to which the present state of a system constrains that system’s potential past and future states. We may therefore speak of the cause
information in the system, which is a measure of the extent to which the present state of the
system constrains its immediate past state, and the effect information in the system, which is a
measure of the extent to which the present state of the system constrains its immediate future
7 There is an important parallel here with quantum theory. In addition to realist (“psi-ontic”) interpretations
of quantum theory, there are also anti-realist (“psi-epistemic”) interpretations which deny the existence of a
quantum physical reality, e.g. Caves et. al. (2002). If we allow quantum interpretations that deny that the
quantum formalism describes a real microphysical reality, then we should also allow interpretations of IIT that
deny that the IIT formalism describes the reality of consciousness.
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state. The information (per se) is defined as the minimum of the cause information and the effect
information.8
Let’s consider how we measure the cause information in a system (the same principles apply
to the measurement of the effect information). First, we need to identify the state space of the
system, i.e. all of its possible configurations. We must then assign two probability distributions
to this state space, an a priori distribution, and an a posteriori distribution.
The a priori probability distribution is relatively trivial as it assigns equal probability to each
possible state in the state space. It can be thought of as the probability that the system was, in
the previous moment, in one of its possible states, given that we know nothing about its current
state.9
The a posteriori probability distribution depends upon the actual state of the system and the
rules that govern the interactions among its parts. It can be thought of as the probability that
the system was, in the previous moment, in one of its possible states, given that we do know its
current state.
Cause information is defined as the distance between these two probability distributions.
There are various ways of measuring the distance between two probability distributions.10 The
distance measure should give zero for identical distributions and give greater values the greater
the divergence in the two probability distributions. Intuitively, one can think of it as a measure
of the work required to transform one distribution into the other. The cause information in a
system is therefore a measure of the extent to which the system’s current state constrains the
probability distribution assigned to its past state space.
Thus, let D(P1 || P2 ) be the distance between probability distributions P1 and P2 . Let p(S p )
be the a priori probability distribution that assigns equal probabilities to all possible (past)
states of system S. And let p(S p | S c = s) be the a posteriori probability distribution for S’s
possible past states given its current state s. The cause information (ci) of S is then given by:
ci(S p |S c = s) = D(p(S p |S c = s)||p(S p )).

(1)

We will return to this definition later, to consider what motivates its role in modeling consciousness (Sec. 3.1), and whether it can be considered a fundamental quantity (Sec. 4.1). The
remaining notions of integration, and Q-shape, will now simply be defined intuitively.
A system’s information is integrated if it is not determined by the information in its parts
(treated independently). The relevant parts to consider are defined by the minimum information
partition (MIP). This is the partition into independent parts that leaves the least information
unaccounted for by the parts. The amount of integrated information in the system represents
the amount of information in the system that is not determined by the information in its parts
defined by the MIP. This amount is represented by φ.11
For a system S with φ = N (N > 0), it is possible that S has a part with φ > N , and
it is possible that S is part of a larger system with φ > N . In either case, S’s φ is not the
theoretically interesting quantity. For such overlapping systems, the interesting quantity is the
φ of the system with the largest φ, or φmax . (Under Orthodox-IIT, only φmax is a measure of
consciousness.)
8 The reason for taking the minimum is explained in Oizumi et al. (2014, pp.7-8). Note that information
has broader application than is presented here. For example, we may speak of the information about a system
contained in one of its subsystems. This is a measure of the extent to which the subsystem constrains the past
and future states of the system. This will not be needed in what follows.
9 One might think that there are other constraints (other than its present state) that suggest that the a priori
distribution should be something other than an equiprobable one. Here it is important to note that the current
mathematical formalism is not immutable, and revisable in light of such considerations.
10 See e.g. Tononi (2012, pp.319-20, note 7).
11 For a formal definition of φ see Oizumi et al. (2014, pp.8-13).
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Finally, a Q-shape is specified by the informational relationships generated by the system
(Balduzzi & Tononi (2009)). For a φmax system, one can draw up its informational relationships
in a space called “qualia-space” or “Q-space”. The dimensions of Q-space correspond to the
possible states of the system. The dimensions are of unit length, corresponding to probability
one. A point in Q-space therefore picks out a probability distribution. Thus, one can identify
many points in this space corresponding to how different parts of the φmax system constrain the
system’s probability distribution. Together these points will create a shape, a Q-shape. (Under
Orthodox-IIT, each Q-shape determines a specific qualitative character or quale.)

2.2

The empirical content

The predictions of Neutral-IIT all concern correlations between integrated information and the
observable symptoms of consciousness. As subject’s phenomenal reports are the paradigm of
such observable symptoms, the predictions will be phrased in terms of them. There are two
primary predictions:
(i) Subjects’ reports on when they are conscious are correlated with the presence of
maximally integrated information (φmax ) states in those subjects.
(ii) Subjects’ reports on the qualitative character of their conscious experience are
correlated with the Q-shape of their φmax states.
It will also be useful in what follows to define an optional additional prediction:
(iii) Subjects’ reports on the extent to which they are conscious are correlated with
the amount of information integration in those subjects.
Neutral-IIT deliberately imposes weak constraints on what counts as “correlated”. One reason
for this is that phenomenal reports must be treated with care, as they are not always reliable.
But perhaps the main reason for the weak constraints is that the nature of the correlations will
be clarified in different ways depending on one’s interpretation. The predictions can become
more constrained as the set of possible interpretations becomes more constrained by empirical,
mathematical, and conceptual advances.
By focusing on (i) we can see that Neutral-IIT is falsifiable. Thus, if we find that the information in human brains invariably has zero integration, whenever such humans report having
phenomenally rich conscious experiences, then Neutral-IIT is falsified. However, there are a
number of situations left open to interpretation. Firstly, Neutral-IIT allows that conscious experience only arises when φmax reaches some large threshold. Secondly, Neutral-IIT allows that
artificial systems can be built to generate phenomenal reports (or analogues), despite having zero
φ. Thirdly, Neutral-IIT allows that artificial systems can be built to generate large φ despite not
being conscious, since it allows that consciousness arises out of information integration combined
with some other (perhaps yet to be discovered) factors.
Now consider (ii). The basic idea is that the (reported) structure in subjects’ phenomenology
corresponds to (Q-shape) structure found in their φmax states. But the correspondence need only
be a mapping that enables the prediction of the reports given the Q-shapes. There need not be
structural similarity between the (reported) phenomenal structure and the Q-shape structure.12
12 One potential barrier to the philosophical neutrality of (ii) concerns how fine-grained Q-shapes are. In IIT
it is nearly impossible for any two individuals, or any one individual at two distinct times, to have identical
Q-shapes. This would seem to rule out the possibility of any two individuals, or any one individual at two distinct
times, having identical qualia. If one’s philosophical theory of consciousness entails that this is in fact possible,
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Finally, prediction (iii) is optional. Reports on the extent to which we are conscious are rare,
and open to interpretation. For example, we sometimes speak of consciousness diminishing as
we fall asleep. But this provides little data, and could be understood in various ways. Indeed,
Tononi (2008, p241) suspects that our ability to judge consciousness levels might be poor in an
analogous way to our ability to judge temperature levels. We are good at judging temperature
if it fluctuates around familiar levels, but not for levels outside that familiar range. We may
therefore need a φ-measure for the same reason we need a thermometer. Indeed, if we have
empirical justification for prediction (i), then since φ comes in degrees, we might thereby have
abductive justification for consciousness coming in degrees, whether or not we can make good a
priori sense of this claim. On the other hand, if one is simply opposed to talk of consciousness
levels, one could simply drop (iii). For it is conceivable that future research could yield strong
empirical support for (ii), yet only support (i) in the sense that consciousness emerges when
φmax reaches a certain threshold.
Even given Neutral-IIT’s weak readings of (i)-(iii), the question remains: why would anyone
take them seriously in the first place? After all, we simply do not have the technology to measure
the φ (and hence, the Q-shapes) in any human brain components. Nor is such technology in
the foreseeable future. So why even put time and money into developing IIT? To answer this
question, we need epistemological interpretations.

3
3.1

Epistemological interpretations of IIT
Epistemology I: the orthodox axiomatic method

The starting point for Orthodox-IIT is encapsulated in the following statement: “As recognized
by Descartes, my own experience is the only thing whose existence is immediately and absolutely
evident” (Tononi et. al. 2016: p451). This statement contains both an ontological claim
(consciousness exists, illusionism is false), and an epistemological claim (experience is known
with a special kind of certainty).
According to Orthodox-IIT, IIT is justified in a two step process. In the first step, a set of
five axioms are formulated. From the glossary of Oizumi et. al (2014, p4), axioms are defined as
follows:
Axiom: “Self-evident truth about consciousness. The only truths that, with Descartes,
cannot be doubted and do not need proof.”
Once these axioms are formulated a set of postulates about the physical mechanisms underlying consciousness are derived. The mathematical formalism is then based upon these postulates.
From the same glossary, postulates are defined as follows:
Postulates: “Assumptions, derived from axioms, about the physical substrates of consciousness, which can be formalized and form the basis of the mathematical framework
of IIT.”
Thus, the core evidence for IIT is derived from the purported self-evident nature of the
axioms. As stated by Oizumi et al. (2014):
then one might reject (ii), making Neutral-IIT not completely neutral. Thanks to Tim Bayne for pointing this
out. In response, one could say that the different fine-grained experiential qualities predicted by the fine-grained
differences in the Q-shapes of two seemingly identical experiences is just not cognitively accessed. Alternatively,
one could weaken (ii) by correlating qualia only with coarse-grained Q-shape structure.
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“IIT starts from the fundamental properties of the phenomenology of consciousness,
which are identified as axioms of consciousness. Then IIT translates these axioms
into postulates, which specify which conditions must be satisfied by physical mechanisms, such as neurons and their connections, to account for the phenomenology of
consciousness. It must be emphasized that taking the phenomenology of consciousness as primary, and asking how it can be implemented by physical mechanisms, is
the opposite of the approach usually taken in neuroscience: start from neural mechanisms in the brain, and ask under what conditions they give rise to consciousness,
as assessed by behavioural reports.”.
Let’s look at how this works. The aim is to derive the form of the physical substrate of
consciousness from axioms about consciousness. The first axiom is the existence axiom, which
states that consciousness exists. The corresponding postulate, the existence postulate, states that
mechanisms exist, where a mechanism is a physical system with causal power. If we assume the
causal power is necessary for physical existence, then the existence postulate is derivable, at least
from the conjunction of the existence axiom and the claim that if consciousness exists then it
has a physical substrate.
The second axiom is the composition axiom, which states that consciousness is compositional
(structured), such that each experience consists of multiple aspects in various combinations. The
corresponding postulate, the composition postulate, states that the physical substrate must be
compositional, that the relevant mechanisms are combined into higher order ones. The postulate plausibly does follow from the axiom (again, in conjunction with conditional claim that if
consciousness exists then it has a physical substrate).
But how much more about the structure of the physical substrate of consciousness can we
derive from phenomenology alone? As I will now argue, very little, and certainly not enough to
suggest the formal definition of information.
Consider the third axiom, and its corresponding postulate. The third axiom is the information
axiom:
Information axiom: “Consciousness is informative: each experience differs in its particular way from other possible experiences. Thus, an experience of pure darkness is
what it is by differing, in its particular way, from an immense number of other possible experiences. A small subset of these possible experiences include, for example,
all the frames of all possible movies.”
The idea appears to be that it is self-evident (at least on phenomenological reflection), that
experiences are informative and that they inform by exclusion. For example, if I walk into a
room and see a blue wall, the experience informs by ruling out an experience of a red wall, an
orange wall (etc.) and the extent to which the experience informs corresponds to the extent to
which the experience rules out other possible experiences that I could have had when looking at
the wall.13 What can we derive from this that is relevant to describing the physical substrate of
such experiences? Here is the information postulate:
Information postulate: “A mechanism can contribute to consciousness only if it specifies ‘differences that make a difference’ within a system. That is, a mechanism in a
13 Tononi

is not consistent with the formulation of this axiom. On some formulations, the claim that consciousness is informative is replaced with the claim that consciousness is specific, see Tononi (2017a). However,
this makes the axiom vacuous, effectively equivalent to the logical truth that a given experience is what it is by
differing from what it is not (Cf. Bayne (2018)). And since no non-tautologous conclusion can be validly drawn
from a tautologous premise, there is no hope of deriving a postulate from this axiom.
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state generates information only if it constrains the states of a system that can be
its possible causes and effects. The more selective the possible causes and effects, the
higher the information.”
Here the talk of a state of a system constraining the causes (immediate past) of the system
should remind one of equation (1) above, the equation for the cause information (ci ) in a system.
Indeed, this postulate strongly suggests the formal definition of information. But is the information postulate even suggested by, let alone derivable from, the information axiom? I think not.
To see why, compare the information postulate with the following, made-up postulate:
Made-up postulate: A mechanism can contribute to consciousness only if it specifies
‘differences that make a difference’ within a system. That is, a mechanism in a state
generates information only if it excludes other possible states that it could have been
in. The more possible states it excludes, the higher the information.
I claim that if any physical postulate is derivable from the information axiom, it is the
made-up postulate. The axiom tells us that an experience informs by excluding alternative
experiences that could have been had instead. The amount of information corresponds to the
amount excluded. I infer from this that the physical system whose state generates the relevant
experience contains information in the sense of excluding other possible states that the system
could have instead been in. The more possible states it excludes, the greater the information.
Thus, take the experience of the wall’s blue colour. The physical system that is the experience’s
physical substrate could have been reconfigured to have generated an experience of red, or an
experience of green etc. The more configurations it excludes by being in its actual configuration,
the more information it contains. Indeed, we can imagine building a formalism for this. The
information in the relevant physical system is equal to Log2 (N ) where N is the number of states
it could have been in.
I am not claiming that the made-up postulate should play any role in neuroscience. Rather, its
role is to help make apparent the invalid inference from the information axiom to the information
postulate. The inference is invalid because the axiom says nothing about past or future, cause or
effect. These notions are simply smuggled into the information postulate in an ad hoc manner.
The made-up postulate, by removing such talk, stays truer to the axiom. But the made-up axiom
fails to provide any useful description of the physical mechanisms underlying consciousness. Thus,
while it may be possible to derive some physical postulates from the axioms, they can never have
rich enough content to form the basis of a theory of the physical substrate of consciousness.14

3.2

Epistemology II: the natural kind approach

If the orthodox epistemology fails, then we are left with the problem of justifying the basic idea
behind IIT: why think that information integration has anything at all to do with consciousness
(or its observable symptoms)?
After criticizing the orthodox epistemology, Bayne (2018) suggests an alternative epistemology for IIT, which he calls the natural kind approach. According to this approach, consciousness
is treated as a natural kind, which manifests itself via the observable symptoms of consciousness.
One aims to find an underlying mechanism that accounts for those symptoms. Consciousness is
then identified with the underlying mechanism. Crucially, the axioms still play a role in Bayne’s
account. The axioms are not (necessarily) considered to be axiomatic in the sense of being
14 The same problem will apply to the fourth, integration postulate. The unity of consciousness does not in any
way suggest the integration of information in the relevant sense of information. For additional criticism of the
orthodox epistemology see Bayne (2018) and McQueen (forthcoming).
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self-evident essential properties of consciousness. But they play a role by being a subset of the
set of symptoms of consciousness that stand in need of explanation. Thus, one symptom of
consciousness would be being integrated (or more cautiously, being judged to be integrated).
There are two problems with the natural kind approach. The first is that it is far from clear
that the axioms should be included in the set of consciousness symptoms that stand in need of
explanation, especially in light of Bayne’s own trenchant criticism of them. Bayne argues, quite
persuasively, that each of the axioms either is too vacuous to place any constraint on a theory
of consciousness, or is too controversial to be considered an axiom. Either way, they do not
have the status of data that must be explained by any theory of consciousness. Here we have
considered the information axiom in particular. It is entirely unclear whether it is even true that
consciousness informs through exclusion. But even if it does, it is not at all clear that this is a
property of consciousness, perhaps it is just a property of our cognition, and how it happens to
use conscious states to form beliefs.
The second problem with the natural kind approach, at least for present purposes, is that it
is not sufficiently neutral. The natural kind approach assumes that consciousness exists (as a
natural kind). But as has been stressed already, there is no reason why illusionists cannot help
themselves to Neutral-IIT. For example, in the case of Illusionist-IIT (McQueen, forthcoming),
Neutral-IIT is used to describe the kinds of states that introspection is prone to misrepresent,
and to formulate and test correlations between integrated information and the production and
expression of those misrepresentations. But if the axioms play no role at all in the justification
of Neutral-IIT, then why should we take it seriously?

3.3

Epistemology III: minimal fallibilism

Here I offer a minimal fallibilist solution. Fallibilist, because it rejects the idea of infallible,
self-evident knowledge, and instead treats scientific hypotheses as extremely tentative. Minimal, because it provides just enough justification for Neutral-IIT to be rationally adopted (and
adapted) by various alternative ontological interpretations, even illusionism (Sec 4).
The solution is broken down into four steps. Step one begins with experimental justification
for the importance of complexity or interconnectivity measures of consciousness. Step two then
requires researchers to focus in on a specific complexity measure that can be developed and
tested. Here, it simply does not matter how the researcher discovers their measure. The task is
simply to get various measures on the table so that they can be experimentally scrutinized. One
researcher might formulate what they take to be essential properties of consciousness and then
try to derive their measure from those. Another researcher might find insight for the structure
of a particular measure in a dream. This is hardly without precedent in the history of science.
The structure of the Benzene ring, after all, is said to have come to Kekule von Stradonitz in a
dream. Clearly, dreams do not justify theories. But they can play a heuristic role in the context
of discovering a theory. So too for Tononi’s axioms and his derivations from them. Step three
involves extrapolating predictions from the chosen measure. Step four involves experimentally
testing those predictions. Let us consider each step in more detail.
Step one: evidence for complexity measures. The first step in motivating the bare theory involves finding empirical support for complexity, or interconnectivity measures of consciousness.
There is indeed such support. Compare the cerebellum to the cerebrum. Although the cerebellum has far more neurons than the cerebrum, the cerebrum is crucial to (reports of) consciousness
whereas the cerebellum seems irrelevant. If neuron number is not relevant to (reports of) consciousness, then what is? Finding a crucial difference between the cerebrum and the cerebellum
may answer the question. And indeed there is a striking difference in their interconnectivity:
probe a region of cerebellum and it has little effect on other regions, but probe a region of cere-
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brum and it is has significant effects on other regions of the cerebrum. This provides prima facie
empirical support for the hypothesis that (reports of) consciousness has something to do with
interconnectivity. And there is plenty more empirical evidence along these lines (see e.g. Koch
(2018)).
Step two: hypothesizing specific complexity measures. The next step involves cutting down
the set of all possible complexity measures so that one can focus one’s research on some manageable subset. It matters little how a researcher does this. Here “axioms” may play a heuristic
role in focusing a researchers attention on some possible subset. And this is one way that the
φmax measure can enter the picture. Crucially, the axioms are helping to discover as opposed
to justify more specific measures. There is an analogy here with the discovery, and subsequent
justification, of planetary orbit models. Consider the beginning of the scientific revolution. Natural philosophers knew that orbits were required to predict planetary observations. But which
orbits? Creative thinking enabled natural philosophers to discover different hypotheses, including Ptolemy’s complex geocentric epicycles, Copernicus’ circular heliocentric orbits, and Kepler’s
heliocentric elliptical orbits. It is said that Kepler was motivated to develop the heliocentric view
due to a mystical belief in the mathematical simplicity of universe. This helped him discover
a specific theory of orbits, which would later be justified when sufficient technology (powerful
telescopes) arose. Similarly, advocates of the orthodox interpretation have a (mystical?) belief
that the physical substrate of consciousness can be derived from self-evident phenomenological
considerations. Such considerations are playing the crucial role of discovery, but not necessarily
justification, which often must come later. This gets us to the first prediction of Neutral-IIT,
which relates (reports of) the presence of consciousness to information integration. The hypothesis is tentative, but worth working on and developing if we think some such complexity measure
is justified by the evidence discussed in step one.
Step three: hypothesize correlations between features of the specific measure and (reported)
features of consciousness. Just as astronomers might try to derive new observable predictions
from a newly hypothesized astronomical model, so too can neuroscientists try to derive new
observable predictions from a newly hypothesized complexity measure. For if the hypothesized
complexity measure really does correspond to consciousness (at least in the sense of prediction
(i)), then it is reasonable to suppose that more specific features of that measure correspond to
more specific (reported) features of consciousness. This is how we get to predictions (ii) and
(iii). Thus, if the hypothesized complexity measure is an unbounded ratio scale, then we might
predict that insofar as we are capable of making judgments about levels of consciousness, they
will correspond to this scale.
Step four: test the structural correlations and revise the measure accordingly. If there is a
complexity measure that can yield bold predictions (like the correlations in (ii)), then there is
an empirically motivated research program. The program involves testing those correlations. If
those correlations are vindicated, then Neutral-IIT is more fully confirmed, and is on its way to
being a mature scientific theory. If they are not vindicated, then the research program is not yet
to be abandoned. Instead, the empirical findings should be used to revise the original complexity
measure. If some sort of complexity is crucial to consciousness, then this is a natural scientific
way of finding it. And indeed, this is what is happening right now, in attempts to find signatures
of Q-shapes in subjects’ brains to predict what they say about the qualitative character of their
experiences.15
15 For

example, see Tsuchiya et. al. (2017) and Haun et. al. (2017).
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4

Ontological interpretations of IIT

In the context of consciousness studies, an ontology must provide a clear account of the place
of consciousness in nature. This means solving the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers,
1995a). Thus, if consciousness is non-fundamental and arises out of more fundamental physical
processes (realist physicalism), then the ontology should identify those processes and explain how
consciousness arises from them, thereby solving the hard problem. If consciousness is fundamental (Dualism or Russellian panpsychism), then the ontology should identify the fundamental
principles relating consciousness to fundamental physical properties. If consciousness is denied
(illusionism), then the ontology must solve the illusion problem by explaining the physical mechanisms that create the illusion of consciousness.

4.1

Ontology I: The orthodox panpsychist ontology

The orthodox ontology is expressed in most detail in Tononi (2008).16 One of its most crucial
claims is the identity between consciousness and integrated information. But the identity takes
a specific form: every quale is identical to the Q-shape corresponding to a φmax state, and every
Q-shape corresponding to a φmax state is identical to some quale (Tononi, 2008, pp.224-32).
However, due to the abstract nature of Q-shapes, it is not clear how this provides an ontology,
for what is the ontology of Q-shapes? After all, the space within which Q-shapes are defined
is not the ordinary 3D space within which neurons reside. Q-shapes are only defined in the
high-dimensional space whose dimensions correspond to points in the system’s state space. A
point in the high-dimensional space then corresponds to a probability distribution over the state
space. This is perhaps why Tononi then proceeds, after explaining this identity claim, to give his
“provisional manifesto”, in which he explains “implications of the IIT for the place of experience
in our view of the world” (2008, pp.232-40). The three ontologically relevant claims arising from
this analysis are that consciousness is pervasive, fundamental, and intrinsic. I will take each of
these in turn.
Consciousness is pervasive: “IIT implies that many entities, as long as they include
some functional mechanisms that can make choices between alternatives, have some
degree of consciousness” (Tononi 2008: p236).
Integrated information seems easy to come by in nature. Isolated atoms and molecules will
have it insofar as their internal states constrain their past and future states. Various parts of
the cerebrum that are not excluded by the cerebrum’s φmax region will presumably also contain
integrated information. So will regions of the cerebellum that have greater φ than the cerebellum
itself. Moreover, it is possible to build simple devices with greater φ than the human cerebrum
(Tononi, 2014). If there is consciousness where φ is maximized, then consciousness will be
pervasive (though not necessarily everywhere). We thus have a form of panpsychism.
Consciousness is fundamental : “it exists as a fundamental quantity—as fundamental
as mass, charge, or energy” (Tononi 2008: p233).
Tononi treats consciousness as fundamental because he identifies consciousness with (Qshapes of) integrated information and treats integrated information as fundamental. He compares the conception of the fundamental level of the universe in terms mass-energy distributions
in spacetime, with a conception of the fundamental level of the universe in terms of integrated
information distributed throughout spacetime. They are described as “equally valid”. Indeed,
16 See

also Tononi (2017b).
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Tononi even speculates that “entities with high φ exist in a stronger sense than entities of high
mass.”
Consciousness is intrinsic: (i) “a complex generating integrated information is conscious in a certain way regardless of any extrinsic perspective” (Tononi 2008: p233);
(ii) “According to IIT, being implies ‘knowing’ from the inside [...] Describing, instead, implies ‘knowing’ from the outside.” (Tononi 2008: p234).
The intrinsicness claim is important if we are to locate Orthodox-IIT within existing ontologies
in the philosophy of mind. However, Tononi’s use of ‘intrinsic’ is obscure and appears ambiguous
between (i) objective and (ii) metaphysically intrinsic (hence quotes (i) and (ii)). The claim that
one’s consciousness is objective (does not depend on others’ perspectives) is not illuminating,
since it is accepted as obvious by all realist ontologies. But Tononi also appears to use this notion
in a stronger sense, as it plays a significant role in his solution to the hard problem.
To see this, consider how Tononi proposes to answer the “Mary the Neuroscientist” thought
experiment (Jackson, 1982), which is routinely used to express the hard problem (e.g. Chalmers
1995b). Tononi concedes that although Mary (while in her black and white room) has all physical
information about colour experience, she does not have all information about colour experience.
But what is she missing if she can fully describe all Q-shapes corresponding to all possible
colour experiences? “Obviously, although a full description can provide understanding of what
experience is and how it can be generated, it cannot substitute for it: being is not describing.”
(p234). Thus, when Mary leaves the room, she is no longer simply trying to describe colour
experience from the extrinsic perspective, she enters a state which is colour experience, enabling
her to know it from the intrinsic perspective.
This is effectively the solution offered by the version of pansychism known as Russellian
panpsychism (Mørch (2018)). According to this view, physical descriptions only describe extrinsic
properties of objects. They fail to describe their intrinsic natures. For example, to say that a
particle has mass is to say something about what it is disposed to do when it encounters other
entities: the particle is disposed to resist acceleration when it encounters an applied force. But
what is it about the particle intrinsically, that gives it this disposition? Physics does not say,
since physics is restricted to the extrinsic perspective. According to the Russellian panpsychist,
the only truly intrinsic property we know of is consciousness, so it is concluded that all intrinsic
natures (even for particle mass!) are consciousness-like (hence the panpsychism). Mary, insofar
as she only possesses descriptions of colour experience Q-shapes in her black and white room,
has an incomplete picture. For she has only the extrinsic skeletons of the experiences. What she
is missing is their intrinsic natures, which physical descriptions cannot capture. The philosophy
of mind that best captures Orthodox-IIT, then, is Russellian panpsychism.
Here I raise two objections. First, I object to the intrinsicness claim. In particular, I argue
that integrated information, as defined by Tononi, is a paradigmatically extrinsic property;
but then identifying consciousness with integrated information (or the Q-shapes it determines)
renders consciousness extrinsic, in contradiction to the axiom.
Secondly, I object to the claim that consciousness is fundamental because integrated information is fundamental. In particular, I argue that for a quantity to be fundamental it needs to be
well-defined at all scales, but integrated information fails this requirement. This latter objection
will in turn undermine the pervasiveness claim.
Recall the definition of information from section 2.1. First one defines the state space of the
target system, the set of all its possible states. But what defines this space? For a closed system,
this is straightforward. A closed system is not interacting with any other system. So its state
space is all configurations of the system allowed by physical laws. But IIT does not typically
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deal with closed physical systems, it deals with open systems that are heavily interacting with
their environments. How do you define the state space of an open system?
The usual expositions of IIT tend to ignore this question, since such expositions are restricted
to simple systems of logic gates. For example, Oizumi et. al. (2014, p5, figure 1) consider a
system of four logic gates, A, B, C, and D. Rather than calculating the information in the closed
system ABCD, they calculate the information in the open subsystem ABC. D is then treated
as a “background condition”. D does not affect the size of the state space of ABC, which still
has eight members corresponding to the eight possible assignments of on/off states. But D does
affect the assignment of probabilities, because depending on its state, D can turn A on or off.
Thus, one takes the state of D as “fixed”. So if we consider what prior state of ABC could have
led to the current state of ABC, it had better be consistent with the fixed state of D, which may
constrain the probability assignments.17
Let us now imagine that the open subsystem ABC is the physical substrate of one’s consciousness. According to IIT, it must be a maximum of φ, for example, it must be that
φ(ABC) > φ(ABCD). Is one’s consciousness intrinsic to ABC’s state? Clearly not, since if
we vary the state of D (an entity extrinsic to ABC), then we vary the φ of ABC’s state, not
to mention its Q-shape. But then one’s consciousness is not intrinsic to its physical substrate.
IIT’s treatment of background conditions makes clear that one’s state of consciousness does not
supervene on the state of its physical substrate. So then in what sense is consciousness intrinsic?
Now consider the claim that consciousness is fundamental. For a property to be fundamental,
it must be well-defined at all scales. But many problem cases arise once we consider realistic
systems. Consider a system where the relative positions and momenta of its parts matter, and
so must enter into the definition of the system’s state space. This means that each member of
the state space assigns positions and momenta to each part of the system. If we are defining
a fundamental quantity, we cannot be vague. Hence, each member of the state space must be
specified in terms of absolutely precise positions and momenta for each part of the system. But
how can we do that in light of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle? According to this principle,
there is a fundamental limit to the precision with which certain pairs of physical properties, such
as position and momentum, can be determined.
If one is to hold on to the idea that integrated information is fundamental, there seems to be
no other option but to opt for some sort of quantum definition of integrated information. The
possible states of a system would then no longer be characterized in terms of the exact positions
and momenta of objects. Instead, they would be characterized in terms of the possible wavefunctions of the system.18 But on the face of it, this looks destined to fail. The wave-function of
the system will describe the system at the fundamental microphysical scale. But IIT requires that
we calculate φ at every scale to find the scale at which φ is maximized. That means comparing
the φ calculated at the microphysical quantum scale with the φ calculated at the mesoscopic
neuronal scale. The latter calculations land us back in the original problem. Perhaps this scaling
aspect could be revised leaving us with a purely quantum notion of integrated information. But
now the problem is that the quantum measure seems entirely divorced from the empirical data
that is supposed to support IIT. For example, part of the empirical support for IIT is the fact
that it is able to distinguish the kind of interconnectivity found in the cerebrum that is lacking
in the cerebellum. But this interconnectivity concerns classical interactions happening at the
neuronal scale.
This concern in turn affects the orthodox claims about consciousness being pervasive and
intrinsic. It is difficult to evaluate the claim that integrated information (and hence, conscious17 This

is explained in the supporting information: Ouzumi et. al. (2014, Text S2, Supplementary methods).
precisely, since we are dealing with open systems, they would be characterized in terms of the possible
reduced density matrices of the system.
18 More
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ness) is pervasive if information is not well-defined for most realistic systems. Similarly, when
the Russellian panpsychist states that consciousness constitutes the intrinsic nature of the extrinsic properties of physics, it is assumed that those properties are well-defined. For if they were
not, then consciousness would not be well-defined. But if consciousness constitutes the intrinsic
nature of integrated information, then this negative implication follows.19
In general, for integrated information to even be a candidate fundamental quantity, its formalization must transcend mere wire diagrams. Until then, the orthodox ontology fails to provide a
defensible interpretation of IIT. Let us now consider alternative ontological interpretations that
allow (in fact, require) integrated information to be non-fundamental.

4.2

Ontology II: The phenomenal concepts strategy

According to the phenomenal concepts strategy (PCS), consciousness exists, is non-fundamental,
and is identical to some non-fundamental physical states (its neural correlates). The hard problem
is an inevitable consequence of the special way in which we think about and conceptualize our
own conscious states. In particular, we think about our own conscious states in terms of special
phenomenal concepts. What makes these concepts special is that they are inferentially isolated.
To start with, consider a concept that is not inferentially isolated, the concept ‘bachelor’. If
one has a thought that incorporates this concept, say, the thought that Jones is a bachelor, then
one can infer various other thoughts, that Jones is a man, that Jones is unmarried, etc. These
inferences happen because the concept of a bachelor is inferentially connected to other concepts
(man, unmarried, etc). According to the PCS, most concepts have rich inferential connections.
Phenomenal concepts are deemed special because they are inferentially isolated. This means
that they do not support the kinds of inferences described above. We characterize phenomenal
properties intrinsically, in terms of what they are like in and of themselves. This intrinsic
characterization isolates phenomenal concepts from other concepts. From the fact that I have
phenomenology with a character like “this”, I cannot infer much at all.
The PCS now solves the hard problem as follows. Consciousness seems hard to explain
because we want to infer phenomenology from physical descriptions of brain activity. But such
inferences are prevented by the conceptual isolation of phenomenal concepts. Nonetheless, there
is a purely physical account of conceptual isolation. Therefore, although we cannot deduce
consciousness from physical descriptions, we can deduce that this deduction failure is inevitable!
And this is enough for realist physicalism.
Consider Mary the neuroscientist. In the black and white room she does not have the concept
of phenomenal redness. Since this concept is inferentially isolated, Mary cannot construct this
concept from the ones she has. When Mary leaves the room, she looks at a rose and her brain
enters a state which allows her to construct the concept of phenomenal redness. For she can
now define this concept as the concept of being in “this” (neural) state. According to PCS,
inferentially isolated phenomenal concepts are physical mechanisms in the brain. So PCS is a
form of physicalism. There are different versions of the PCS that offer different theories of these
mechanisms (Balog (2009)).
I will not try to evaluate the plausibility of the PCS here.20 Instead I will consider a possible
form for a PCS interpretation of IIT (PCS-IIT).
It seems PCS-IIT cannot adopt the orthodox axiomatic epistemology. Phenomenal concepts
are not conceptually connected to the concepts expressed in the axioms (information, integration,
19 Mørch (2018) has demonstrated an inconsistency between IIT and Russellian panpsychism, which she fixes
by revising the IIT exclusion postulate. However, the above considerations still apply to the revised theory.
For further considerations against the fundamentality of integrated information, see Barrett & Seth (2011) and
Peressini (2013).
20 Though see Chalmers (2007) for critique.
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etc.). For this reason, the postulates cannot be inferred from phenomenology alone.
One might weaken the PCS slightly. Perhaps phenomenal concepts are not completely
isolated, perhaps certain abstract properties of the physical substrate of consciousness bleeds
through into phenomenal concepts. And perhaps this explains the pull of some of the axioms.
However, in light of the problems raised for the orthodox epistemology, it seems that PCS-IIT
need not go in this questionable direction. And anyway, this would be against the spirit of the
approach. PCS-IIT can set aside the axioms and adopt the minimal fallibilist epistemology.
The PCS-IIT research program will try to use Neutral-IIT to help describe the physical
mechanisms that underly phenomenal concepts. On the one hand, Neutral-IIT provides PCS
with a framework for locating those mechanisms, since they seem to only act on φmax states.
On the other, Neutral-IIT may also help to explain why those states are the only ones that
engender phenomenal concepts. In return, PCS can offer Neutral-IIT a better solution to the
hard problem than is offered by Orthodox-IIT.
Finally, it is open to PCS-IIT to embrace pervasiveness aspect of Orthodox-IIT. But it is
also open to PCS-IIT to maintain that consciousness requires additional factors that entail that
consciousness only arises when φmax reaches a certain threshold. Given the problems raised
against the fundamentality of integrated information above, the latter is likely a better option.
The challenge then, is to spell out the additional factors. Our next ontology provides some
options.

4.3

Ontology III: Representationalism

According to representationalism, consciousness exists, is non-fundamental, and is identical to
certain representational properties. More precisely, conscious experiences are physical states
which have phenomenology, or phenomenal properties (qualia). A given phenomenal property
(a given quale) is identical to a certain representational property, the property of representing
a certain content. The idea is that all facts about representational properties can be physically
described, thereby justifying physicalism. Representationalism comes in a wide variety of forms.21
Here I will focus on one version of representationalism that has interesting connections to IIT.
Two decades after formulating the Mary the neuroscientist thought experiment, Frank Jackson had a change of heart. He now concludes that Mary can deduce all facts from within her
black and white room, including all facts about redness phenomenology. Jackson (2003) defends
this turnaround in terms of a version of representationalism. After explaining it, I will use it to
formulate a representationalist-IIT.
Jackson’s representationalism begins with the transparency of experience thesis. Whenever
we try to describe our phenomenology, we end up just describing properties of the (putative)
objects that our experiences represent. For example, if we try to describe the phenomenology of
an experience of a blue bottle, we say that it has a “bluish” phenomenology, with a “cylindrical”
character. Or take the phenomenology of a pain, being described as “intense and throbbing”.
These notions apply to what the experience represents, not the experience itself. According to
the transparency thesis, what’s happening here is that when we introspect our phenomenology
in the hope of describing it, we in a sense “see right through it”, and end up just describing
properties that the represented objects (e.g. the blue bottle, one’s stubbed toe) are represented
as having. From this, Jackson concludes that a given phenomenal property is identical to a given
representational property, where the representational property is the experience’s property of
representing the world to be thus and so.
21 For the landscape of representationalist views, see Chalmers (2004) and references therein. I am here only
considering versions of representationalism that (using Chalmers’ terminology) satisfy both reductive representationalism and narrow representationalism.
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Representationalism faces a serious challenge. The challenge is to say why some representations (like experiences) have phenomenology whereas other representations (like beliefs) do not.
Thus, only experiences represent “in a phenomenal manner”, and the challenge is to give an account of this phenomenal manner in physical terms. To solve this problem, Jackson specifies five
physical features of phenomenal representations intended to capture the distinctive “phenomenal
manner” in which they represent. Interestingly, there is significant crossover here with Tononi’s
axioms.
Jackson’s five key features of phenomenal representations are: (i) Richness: phenomenal
representations encode so much more information than other representations (like beliefs, or
sentences). For example, one’s visual field typically encodes any number of beliefs concerning
specific locations of colours, shapes, etc. (ii) Inextricability: this is equivalent to Tononi’s integration axiom, as Jackson says, you cannot “prise” the colour bit from the shape bit of a visual
experience. (iii) Immediacy: experiences do not represent by creating a distinct mental state
that does the representing for it, experiences represent directly and immediately. (iv) Causal impact: experiences represent the world as being the cause of those experiences, sound experiences
represent sounds as coming from their location, etc. (v) Functional role: experiencing plays a
distinctive functional role, which includes updating one’s beliefs about the world in an ongoing
way.
According to Jackson, Mary can come to know all facts about what it is like to experience
red, from inside the black and white room. For these are all facts about representing surface
properties of objects in a phenomenal manner. A content is represented in a phenomenal manner
if the representation has features (i)-(v). When Mary leaves the room she will only acquire new
skills (new “know-how”), since she will have the new ability to manipulate her new phenomenal
representation in her cognition, for example, in imagination and memory. But she does not
learn any new facts. All facts about the representation were available to her in the black and
white room. All facts about experience are therefore deducible from purely physical facts, and
physicalism is vindicated.
I will not here evaluate Jackson’s representationalism.22 Instead, I will explain how a
representationalist-IIT might work in the context of Jackson’s representationalism.
There is clearly some cross-over between Jackson’s representationalism and the orthodox
epistemology. Both appeal to five essential features of consciousness. However, they play very
different roles. The five features specified by Orthodox-IIT are supposed to be features of experience itself. Those features are then used to derive the structure of their physical substrate.
But Jackson’s five features are supposed to be features of how experiences represent things to
be (with the exception of the fifth). It is not clear that Tononi’s project of specifying essential
features of the experiences themselves is consistent with the transparency thesis that grounds
Jackson’s representationalism. Still, the difference is a subtle one.
IIT and representationalism could be reconciled in a number of ways. One question is whether
representationalist-IIT should concede that consciousness exists, at least to some degree, wherever φ is maximized. This would entail that certain very simple systems (like grids of XOR gates)
would represent the world in a phenomenal manner. But if we hold on to Jackson’s five features,
we can resist this implication. After all, only two of Jackson’s features (richness, and inextricability) resemble Tononi’s axioms. Jackson could complain that Tononi has provided necessary but
insufficient conditions for consciousness. In addition to an experience maximizing φ, it must in
addition represent with immediacy, with causal impact, and must also play a certain functional
role with belief. The latter requires that a system can only be conscious (i.e. represent in a phenomenal manner) if it is capable of having beliefs (something that the grid seems incapable of).
In that case, representationalist-IIT is not committed to the pervasiveness of consciousness em22 See

Alter (2006) for criticism.
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braced by orthodox-IIT. For presumably only particularly large φmax states will be accessible to
belief. And if the only integrated states of interest are high-level neural states accessible to belief,
then integrated information need not be considered fundamental either. Representationalist-IIT
therefore avoids the problems that plague orthodox-IIT. The following research program is suggested: try to figure out what the physical substrate of experience must be like if it is to support
experiences that not only satisfy richness and inextricability, but also the rest of Jackson’s five
features.

4.4

Ontology IV: Illusionism

According to illusionism, consciousness does not exist. The hard problem of consciousness is
replaced by the illusion problem: explain the physical mechanisms that give rise to the illusion.
For example, according to Frankish (2016), the mechanism of introspection systematically creates
representations that represent experiences as having phenomenology when they in fact do not.
These representations in turn cause us to make nonveridical phenomenal reports, and to feel
puzzled about how phenomenology could arise from physical processes.
To determine whether illusionism is capable of offering an ontological interpretation of IIT,
we can ask the following diagnostic question: if future experiments were to reveal strong support
for the predicted correlation between qualitative character reports and Q-shapes (prediction (ii)
from section 2.2), could illusionists incorporate the data?
It seems the answer is yes. A natural way that illusionists could incorporate this data is
by treating high-φ states as the states that introspection responds to with phenomenological
misrepresentations. The content of those misrepresentations vary in accord with variation in
the Q-shapes of those high-φ states. The illusionist might think that introspection responds
only to states that reach a specific threshold for high-φ. Alternatively, if future research reveals
evidence of correlations between reported amounts of consciousness and amounts of integrated
information (prediction (ii)), then the illusionist could let φ be a measure of the strength of the
introspective illusion. This idea is developed in detail in McQueen (forthcoming), and so will
not be explored further here.
Illusionist-IIT does not face the objections faced by the orthodox ontology. In particular,
it does not require integrated information to be fundamental. In fact, it only requires that the
mathematical formalism applies (approximately) to introspected states, like neural networks. It
also does not entail that any simple systems are conscious. An isolated molecule with nonzero
φ, for example, is not only unconscious, it differs significantly from humans in that it has no
introspective mechanism that could create belief in consciousness.

5

Conclusion

IIT is typically expressed in terms of the orthodox interpretation. Both the epistemology and
the ontology of this interpretation are problematic, and should be rejected. But we should not
therefore reject IIT. Instead, we should distinguish Neutral-IIT from its orthodox interpretation
and find better interpretations. Contemporary philosophy of mind provides many resources
for this task, as illustrated in the three considered cases, the phenomenal concepts strategy,
representationalism, and illusionism.23

23 For helpful feedback I would like to thank Nao Tsuchiya, Leonardo Barbosa, Tim Bayne, Ole Koksvik, and
Gabriel Rabin. This project was funded by the Monash University Network of Excellence for Complexity and
Causation in the Conscious Brain.
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